This paper tests how a major cap-and-trade program, known as the NO x Budget Trading Program (NBP), affected employment in those regions where it was implemented. The cap-and-trade program dramatically decreased levels of NO x emissions and added substantial costs to energy producers. Using a triple-differences approach that takes advantage of the geographic and time variation of the program as well as variation in industry energy-intensity levels, I examine how employment changed in manufacturing industries whose production process requires high levels of energy. After accounting for a variety of flexible county and industry trends, I find that the NBP cap-and-trade program is responsible for the loss of approximately 82,000 jobs in the region where it was implemented. Additional evidence suggests this effect occurred partly through higher electricity prices.
employment in counties that fail to meet NAAQS attainment standards and are thus subject to tighter regulations.
Since the passage of the 1990 CAAA, however, a second and wider reaching policy has taken form with the intent of regulating interstate air pollution. As counties began to realize that their own air quality was affected not only by local polluters but also by polluters from other counties and states, there was a push for the regulation of all establishments whose air pollutants crossed Because the Acid Rain Program applied to all power plants in the country, empirically estimating its impact on employment has been difficult due to the lack of a valid counterfactual. 2 However, for a variety of reasons, the attributes of the recently implemented NBP make for a policy whose impacts are both important and possible to identify. First, the NBP had a major impact on energy production.
The regulations forced 2,250 gas, oil and coal-fired power plants plus 350 large industrial units to make difficult and costly decisions on how to comply with the cap-and-trade scheme. Overall, complying with the NBP was expected to add $2.15 billion dollars of annual costs to utilities, which would largely be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices (Palmer et al. 2001) . Second, this policy was implemented in nineteen eastern states over a period of two years. Many states were not exposed to the NBP and, under certain assumptions discussed 2 For this reason, researchers have generally used structural models to estimate the costs and benefits of the Acid Rain Program (see Burtaw et al. 1998) below, may be considered a valid counterfactual after controlling for preexisting differences. Finally, industries in the NBP region that require high levels of energy in their production process would be expected to be most affected by the NBP. These sources of geographic, time and industry heterogeneity form the basis for the identification strategy used to determine the impact of the NBP on manufacturing employment. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first such credible study of the employment effects of any major EPA cap-and-trade program.
One reason why empirical methods may prove particularly useful is that economic theory gives no clear intuition regarding the effect of energy sector regulation on manufacturing employment (Berman and Bui 2001) . Environmental regulation that causes an exogenous shock in the price of energy is likely to lead to two competing employment effects on an establishment's intensive margin.
First, given that capital and energy are complements and capital and labor are substitutes, a positive shock in the price of energy may lead plant managers to employ more labor and less capital. However, an increase in the price of electricity will also increase marginal costs and decrease the demand for labor due to a decline in production. Furthermore, firm owners may adjust the extensive margin as they take production costs into account when determining plant location. Plants in areas with increased energy prices are more likely to be shut down and newly constructed plants are more likely to be built in regions that did not experience a positive shock to energy prices.
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While qualitative predictions from theory may be somewhat ambiguous, recent empirical research studying the impact of environmental regulation on employment has shown either no change (Berman and Bui 2001) or a decrease in 3 Carlton (1983) and Kahn and Mansur (2012) find strong empirical evidence that electricity prices are a major determinant of manufacturing establishment location decisions.
the employment levels of regions where regulations have been implemented (Greenstone 2002; Kahn and Mansur 2012; Walker 2011) . Furthermore, the broader literature on the impact of environmental regulation has consistently found a negative impact of regulation on other outcomes such as plant openings and productivity levels (Becker and Henderson 2000; Dean et al. 2000; Deschenes 2010; Deschenes et al. 2011; Henderson 1996; Hanna 2010) .
Using a similar technique as that employed by Kahn and Mansur (2012) to study manufacturing industry location, this paper takes advantage of the heterogeneity in industry energy intensity levels to perform a triple differences (DDD) analysis that estimates the NBP's impact on manufacturing employment in the regions where it was enforced. Using County Business Patterns data on employment and NBER's Productivity Database, I am able to account for important county, industry and year controls as well as county and industry trends. These controls will prove important as industries tend toward regional agglomeration and as the manufacturing sector as a whole has experienced general geographic shifts in recent years. Performing the DDD analysis with a broad set of controls, I find that employment in industries with an additional percentage point of energy intensity decreased 0.6% in counties that were impacted by the NBP. These results are both statistically and economically significant and represent a sizable change in the labor markets affected by the policy. In order to evaluate the plausibility of these findings I then examine the NBP's impact on electricity prices. After finding a rise in electricity prices within the range of ex-ante predictions, I then back out an implied manufacturing employment electricity price elasticity of -0.22. While electricity is only one form of energy that is regulated by the NBP, it is reassuring that this elasticity is in line with previous estimates (Kahn and Mansur 2012) . This suggests a plausible causal mechanism for the loss in manufacturing employment.
As with the majority of the literature on regulation and employment (e.g. This wage loss in turn, implies workers are shifted to less productive activities.
Accordingly, the results of this paper have a range of interpretations bracketed by two bookends. If workers who leave the regulated industry are unable to find new jobs, then these employment level changes can, especially in the short run, be considered net job losses. Alternatively, in the long run the results may represent significant and costly job transitions that occurred as a result of the NBP. Under this interpretation, the findings of the paper provide evidence that the NBP caused workers to shift from high energy industries to low energy industries as well as migrate from NBP to non-NBP regions. 4 The true impact is likely to lie somewhere in between. The DDD approach used in this paper shows the number of jobs impacted by the NBP to be significant. A back-of-theenvelope calculation shows that the NBP is seen to be responsible for either a loss or transition of roughly 82,378 manufacturing jobs. These job loss estimates may appear large, but a closer look at the possible causal mechanisms reveals them to be well within the range of possible outcomes. The findings should be considered together with other evidence regarding the costs and the benefits of the NBP policy (Linn 2010; Deschenes et al. 2012) . The benefits that come from improved air quality must be carefully weighed against the economic costs that society will incur when future power plant regulations are considered.
This paper adds to the literature in two important ways. It is the first paper to empirically estimate the impact of any EPA cap-and-trade program on manufacturing employment. Given the current size of the cap-and-trade programs, as well as the current policy debate over their expansion, a better understanding of their impact on labor markets is greatly needed. Second, this is the first paper to use industry-level energy intensity heterogeneity to identify the impact of power plant regulation on manufacturing employment. This negative spillover effect has been assumed by previous papers but none have directly used energy intensity levels to examine if industries with high reliance on energy experienced greater employment losses than those with low reliance.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a brief history of the Clean Air Act Amendments and how the NBP came to be implemented. Section II describes conditions required for identification and Section III details important aspects of the data used in the analysis. Section IV provides the methodology and the econometric model, followed by Section V which provides the results as well as specification checks. Section VI discusses electricity prices and how these results compare to previous research while Section VII concludes.
I. Background
Originally passed in 1963, the Clean Air Act (CAA) is the main federal law that seeks to control air pollution throughout the United States. The CAA has been amended multiple times including 1966, 1970, 1977 and 1990 . Perhaps the most researched of the regulations brought upon by CAA and its amendments is the NAAQS. The NAAQS were established following the 1970 CAAAs and required polluting establishments located in counties that failed to achieve certain air quality levels to meet stricter emissions standards than establishments located in counties whose air quality was deemed acceptable. These emission regulations were by far the most important federal emissions regulations to date. 
II. Identifying NBP Employment Effects
In order to identify the impact of the NBP in employment, it is necessary that several conditions hold. NBP cap-and-trade program it is difficult and perhaps even unnecessary to disentangle the impact of the CAIR announcement from the implementation of NBP. In short, the interpretation of the evidence is influenced only slightly by CAIR, with all results still attributable to the overall capand-trade policy. 11 When examining the NBP's impact on expected future utility profits, Linn (2010) uses 2000 as the beginning date.
A second potential concern with differences-in-differences analysis is that the treatment may have spillover effects on the control groups. One such possible spillover is that the NBP causes jobs to shift from the east to the west or from high energy industries to low energy industries, especially in the long run.
However, even if every worker transfers to a different job, then these results identify costly transitions in the form of job search costs and lost wages during the transition time that were caused by the NBP. At the opposite extreme interpretation, if no spillover effects take place and workers are unable to find new jobs, then the results can be interpreted as measuring overall job loss due to the NBP. Both interpretations represent important and policy relevant changes in the labor market.
Another concern is that the characteristics of the treated group are systematically different than the control group. For a variety of reasons, industry employment levels in eastern counties may be quite different than those in western counties. To account for these time-invariant differences, full sets of county-industry fixed effects are included. Furthermore, it is possible that counties and industries have secular employment trends that are unrelated to the NBP. To address this possibility, I use county and industry-specific linear time trends to control for pre-existing trends; in other models county-year and industry-year indicator variables flexibly account for nonlinear trends.
A final potential concern with any empirical work is that outcomes are driven by unobserved events rather than the treatment of interest. is that certain regions may be particularly sensitive to changes in fuel prices. If an increase in the price of oil raises energy prices uniformly across the country, this will be picked up with the industry-year fixed effects. However, certain regions rely heavily on one particular fuel source for their electricity production. To account for the possibility that regional electricity prices may be differentially impacted by changing relative fuel prices I obtain average oil, natural gas and coal prices for the years 1998-2009 as well as the percent of electricity that is derived from that source in each NERC region in the country. Interacting the fuel price with the percent of electricity derived from that fuel in the county's NERC region and the industry indicator variables allows for the fact that certain industries in certain regions may be particularly sensitive to a change in fuel prices. 12 My results are insensitive to these controls as well.
A final confounding factor is the possibility that high-energy manufacturing industries are still responding to some other event that occurred before the implementation of NBP. For example, if industries in the east and west have different employment trends as a result of the NAAQS or some other feature of earlier CAAA's then these pre-existing trends could be mistakenly attributed to the NBP. To assure that separate pre-existing trends are not being picked up, I
allow for separate industry trends for the east and the west. If the implementation of the NBP causes employment trends to differ by region, then adding these separate trends is likely to pick up some of the impact of the NBP. This will again result in a conservative estimate of the NBP's impact on employment. Thus, my results are identified off of very weak assumptions, which allow for countyspecific non-parametric trends and pre-existing east-west differences in industryspecific trends.
III. Data
The data used to analyze the impact of the NBP on manufacturing While the CBP has the distinct advantage of being publicly available, it also has the disadvantage of having to undergo a thorough review process to prevent the release of any data that would disclose the exact records of any single establishment. Therefore, if very few establishments are located in a particular industry in a county, then employment data will be suppressed for that countyindustry observation. The dataset contains all county-industry observations, but due to disclosure requirements, employment data is missing for 51% of these county-industry pairings. Despite this large loss of observations, the dataset maintains 68% of all manufacturing employment in the country. The fact that this large percentage remains in the dataset can be attributed among other things to the agglomeration of industries and the presence of manufacturing in populated counties. 13 In light of the suppressed data, this paper provides two sets of results.
The first assumes the suppressed observations to be missing at random and runs the analysis on the observations for which employment in a county-industry is directly observed. The second set of results takes advantage of the thirteen establishment-size cell count variables to impute employment when it is suppressed. Employment is imputed by multiplying the number of establishments in each establishment-size cell by the midpoint establishment size of that category. 14 Finally, I present results using state level data, which does not suffer from disclosure issues.
After appending the annual CBP datasets from 1998-2009 at the countyindustry level, I merge in three digit industry energy intensity data from the 1998 NBER Productivity Database. This database contains total energy expenditure by industry in the given year. To construct an energy intensity index for the 21 different 3 digit manufacturing industries, I divide total industry energy expenditure by total value of shipments for the industry. 15 As seen in Table 1, energy intensity in the manufacturing sector varies from a low of 0.6% in the computer and electronic product industry to a high of 5.5% in the primary metal manufacturing industry. Table 2 lists the number of counties, industries and years as well as the number of unique interactions of these variables in the full dataset.
IV. Econometric Model
The identification strategy of this paper takes advantage of the geographic, time and industry heterogeneity found in the data in order to estimate the impact of the NBP on manufacturing employment. To exploit this heterogeneity, I use a DDD framework and estimate the model:
In this model, is the logged value of employment in county c in industry
is a dummy variable equal to one for all observations which fall after the beginning of the NBP. is a dummy variable equal to one if the county is located in an eastern county that was impacted by the policy. is a time-invariant measure of the industry's energy intensity as defined by total energy expenditure divided by total value of shipments for the entire industry in 1998. 16 The main coefficient of interest is , which captures the triple interaction 15 Because the NBP regulated NOx emissions from heat, steam and electricity production I use energy intensity rather than electricity intensity. Furthermore, for some industries the quantity of electricity generated and purchased is suppressed. 16 For those models which include all industries, the energy intensity of non-manufacturing industries is set to zero. Results are not sensitive to this assumption. Alternate models using a of a county-industry pairing being in the treatment group, after the treatment has been applied and allowing for differences by industry based on their energy- The variable East defines all counties which received the NBP policy treatment. The definition of the treated group is informed by the mechanism through which a change in employment would occur. I set East equal to one for dummy variable for non-manufacturing industries result in similar findings. Results using manufacturing only data also give similar findings. 17 See Figure 1 for a map of NBP counties and when the year which they began compliance. 18 Linn (2010) performs a similar analysis in which he estimates the impact of the NBP on electric utility profits. His empirical work uses 2000, the year the Federal Court of Appeals confirmed the NBP would be implemented the first date in which the policy was known to be occurring with certainty. As can be seen in Figure 2 , electricity production itself was not altered until the NBP was implemented. For the purposes of this analysis I assume that manufacturers did not react to the policy until electricity production was actually altered and the price of permits had been established.
all observations whose electric utility provider is impacted by the NBP. 
V. Results
In order to motivate the econometric analysis and provide an introduction to the results, it is useful to begin by computing the mean difference-indifferences by energy intensity quartile using the raw data. Using the energyintensity index in Table 1 , I split industries into three separate groups. Industries in the top quartile of the energy intensity measure are defined as "high intensity industries", those in the bottom quartile are defined as "low intensity industries"
and those in the middle two quartiles are defined as "medium intensity industries". For each of these three groups, a separate differences-in-differences analysis is run to provide a crude measure for the average loss of employment that resulted from the NBP for high, medium and low energy-intensive industries.
Using the definitions of Post and East given above, Table 3 gives the difference- 
A. Main Specification
While the differences-in-differences results in Table 3 and the graph in differ by industry or county. 21 Including these trends together with the countyindustry fixed effects is very important to identifying the impact of the NBP.
Given that the U.S. has experienced population shifts from the east to the west and that manufacturing, in addition to experiencing overall declines in employment, has moved away from the rust belt and to the south and west, it is likely that excluding these trends will overstate the impact of the NBP.
Column 6 differs from column 5 by including separate east and west industry trends to address a final concern that high energy industries in the east may have separate pre-existing trends than high energy industries in the west. trends and shocks that may occur in a given year. 22 In order to address this issue, Table 5 provides results using county employment data for manufacturing industries only. Estimating the model on this smaller dataset helps strengthen the initial results by allowing for the running of two additional regressions that cannot be estimated on larger datasets due to computational restrictions. Columns 1-6 run the identical regressions as in Table 5 and report very similar results on the coefficient of interest. Columns 7 and 8 estimate a three-way fixed effects model using the felsdvreg command in Stata, which captures county-industry, countyyear and year-industry fixed effects. Column 8, like Column 6 allows for the possibility that eastern industry trends may be different than western industry trends by including separate linear eastern and western trends for each industry.
Column 7 is the largest model estimated in the analysis and accounts for nonparametric time trends in all industries and all counties as well as a full set of county-industry fixed effects that capture all time-invariant characteristics that differ between county-industries. Unsurprisingly, using this large number of fixed effects decreases the statistical significance. However the coefficient remains significant at the 10% level with a value of -1.04 and falls within the range of the other models in the table.
One possible concern with the findings in tables 4 and 5 is that using only non-suppressed data may bias the results. To address this issue, Tables 6 and 7 run identical regressions on the full dataset in which the employment for those suppressed cells is imputed using the number of establishments in each establishment size cell grouping as used in Kahn and Mansur (2012) and described above in the data section. Table 6 gives the results using all industries and Table 7 gives results using manufacturing data only. The results are similar to those in Tables 4 and 5 and suggest that using the non-suppressed data alone is unlikely to be a source of significant bias. An alternative solution to the data suppression is to run regressions using states rather than counties as the unit of analysis. These results, found in Table 8 , show a larger impact of the NBP. Data suppression is far less of an issue when using states and as seen in Figure 3 the NBP was largely, though not entirely, a state level policy. For the main results I use the county-level analysis so as to easily compare the findings with the robustness checks which require county level NAAQS attainment variation and which limit the treatment group to only those counties which were directly impacted by the NBP. Table 9 reports a variety of robustness checks to determine whether the results are sensitive to controlling for possible confounding factors and to slight changes in the definition of the treatment group. The first panel of Table 9 report results using the same county level data as in Table 7 but redefine the East variable to be only counties which are directly under the regulation of the NBP.
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B. Robustness Checks
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The treated group in this regression is represented by the shaded counties in Figure 1 . Performing this check ensures that the main results are not being driven primarily by the counties which were not directly regulated.
Panel 2 of Table 9 controls for changes in county level NO x nonattainment standards in 2004 which may have been more likely to impact highenergy industries. In this year new counties were designated non-attainment in both the east and the west but a disproportionate amount were added in the east.
To control for this, I interact the interaction variable with an indicator variable for whether a county was designated as nonattainment in 2004.
23 Table 8 drops Missouri due to the within state variation in NBP status. 24 These regressions drop those counties which are shaded in Figure 2 but not shaded in Figure 1 .
Controlling for NAAQS NO x non-attainment status is not shown to impact the NBP results.
An additional concern is that changes in fuel prices may impact the energy costs of certain regions more than others. Any shock in energy prices that is common to the entire country will be picked up in the industry-year fixed effects but if, for example, there is a shock to the price of oil and certain regions heavily rely on oil for electricity, then it is possible that these regions will see an increase in the cost of energy that is unrelated to the NBP. 25 To ensure that shocks to oil, natural gas and coal prices are not driving the results I gather data on annual fuel prices for each of these fuels and interact these prices with the percent of electricity that is derived from that fuel in the NERC region to which that county belongs. This variable is then interacted with the energy intensity variable to control for the fact that high energy industries in certain regions may be particularly sensitive to fuel price shocks. Panel 3 of Table 9 includes these controls and continues to find a negative impact of the NBP.
As a final robustness check I consider the effect that the NBP had on each specific manufacturing industry by replacing the main triple interaction variable with 21 different industry specific interaction variables. 26 Figure 5 plots the industry specific impact of the NBP against that industry's energy intensity. As expected, the higher the energy intensity of the industry, the greater it was impacted by the NBP. Low energy industries generally experienced no impact while high energy industries experienced a negative impact. The relationship appears to be linear and no single industry is driving the results.
As Table 9 shows, these findings are robust to a variety of specifications and provide strong evidence that a shift in employment levels occurred in energyintensive industries in counties that were impacted by the NBP. All model specifications yield a negative coefficient on the variable PostxEastxEn_Int with the most specified models in the robustness checks showing a loss in employment of about 0.6 percent for every additional percent in energy-intensity. These estimates fall within the range of the base models. So as to be conservative, I
consider -0.6 as the preferred estimate. Using this figure, a simple back-of-theenvelope calculation implies that 82,378 manufacturing jobs were lost as a result of the NBP. 27 To contextualize this employment loss it is helpful to compare it with the findings of previous studies examining the impact of environmental regulation. Greenstone (2002) found the NAAQS, first implemented in the 1970's, to be responsible for 590,000 lost jobs and Walker (2012) found the much smaller 1990 Clean Air Act expansion of the NAAQS to be responsible for the loss of 150,000 jobs. These policies differ significantly from the NBP in both scope and implementation but provide a useful reference point from which to compare the findings of this paper.
VI. Electricity Prices
In order to evaluate the plausibility of this employment loss figure 28 Using a similar differences-in-differences technique as that employed in the previous section, I can identify whether these predicted increases in the price of electricity did in fact occur in states that were subject to the NBP.
29 Table 10 presents the results of these electricity price regressions. As discussed in the previous section, controlling for the price of fuels used in electricity production is important if certain regions in the country have a relatively high reliance on certain fuels to produce electricity. Using the same technique as in the robustness check, I interact the average annual fuel price with the percent of electricity that is derived from that fuel in the NERC region and include these terms in the regression. This allows for the electricity price in regions with high reliance on certain fuels to vary with the price of those fuels. 31 30 The loss of 82,378 jobs equals a 1.29% manufacturing employment loss in the NBP region. The 5.9% increase in the price of electricity would then imply an employment electricity price elasticity of -1.29% / 5.9% = -.22 31 This elasticity is meant to serve as a rough estimate to check the credibility of the employment finding in the previous section. Again, the NBP is likely to have had other impacts on employment in energy intensive manufacturing industries that did not occur through its' impact on electricity prices. Most obviously, the NBP directly regulated the energy production (in the form of heat, steam and electricity) of 350 large manufacturing plants. Furthermore, energy intensive manufacturing firms may have responded to the uncertainty the NBP created in the markets rather than an actual increase in electricity prices. Attributing the entire employment change to electricity prices will overstate the magnitude of the elasticity. In short, generating a well identified elasticity based on the implementation of the NBP would require the unlikely assumption that no other causal mechanism were at play.
VII. Conclusion
This paper Rule would expand the number of states participating in the NOx trading market to 27 and tighten the current NOx standards. Other costly power plant regulations are also being set forth by the EPA including the proposed Toxics Rule. This rule is estimated to add $10.9 billion of annual costs to the power industry, an amount far greater than the estimated $2.1 incurred from the NBP. 32 While the EPA argues that the health benefits still outweigh the costs, it is important to understand the full impact of these policies so as to best design a system that maximizes social welfare. This paper has shown that economically significant employment losses will occur from power plant regulation and that any benefit-32 In March 2011, the EPA proposed a rule that would create a national standard for power plants emissions of mercury, arsenic, chromium, nickel and acid gases which is estimated to cost utilities The estimated annual costs of the program come from EPA estimates (USEPA 2011) cost analysis of future regulations must consider the impact of these regulations on industries for which energy is a crucial input. Here t is the year (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , g is energy intensity group (low, medium, high) and is the average county-industry employment for industry grouping g in east (treated) counties in year t. Dividing by average group employment in 1998 smooths the data to easily compare group differences. All eastwest differences assume the 1998 difference to be the baseline difference, set to zero, against which future differences can be compared. The vertical line is drawn at 2003, the year the NBP went into effect. 
